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NOTES
THE COMMERCE REQUIREMENT OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,1 as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act,2 makes it unlawful to "discriminate in price between pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality." Such discrimination
generally takes two forms. When the defendant's price discrimination
adversely affects competing sellers, then he has unlawfully injured his
primary-line competition.3 On the other hand, when the seller's price
discriminations adversely affect his nonfavored buyers, then he has in-
jured secondary-line competition.4 Section 2 of the original Clayton
Act,5 as enacted in 1914, was designed primarily to prevent injury to
primary line competition by making local price cutting illegal.6 This
section of the act, however, suffered from a number of weaknesses.
First, the prohibition against price discriminations was qualified to al-
low price differentials which were based on the "differences in the...
quantity of the commodity sold."7  Thus once the seller could show a
quantity difference between purchasers he was free to grant unlimited
discounts to the large purchasers." Second, the original act permitted
price discriminations between purchasers when "made in good faith to
meet competition."9 However, once the seller could show that he was
reducing prices only to "meet competition," the act placed no restric-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. H9 13, 13a-13c, 21a (1964) (originally enacted as ch. 592, 49
Stat. 1526 (1936)).
3. For an example of an injury to primary line competition, assume an industry
in which there are two manufacturers (M1, M 2) and two wholesalers (W1 , W2 ). M1
sells to W1 for $1.00 per unit and to W,2 for $0.50 per unit. M 2, who had been selling
to W2 for $1.00 per unit, suffers a decrease in sales. If M, reduced his selling price
to W2 for the purpose of taking business away from M2 , then he has unlawfully injured
a primary line competitor. See F. RowE, PRICE DISCmRmINATION UNDER THE RoBiNsoN-
PATMAN ACT 142-50 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rown].
4. For an example of an injury to secondary line competition, assume one manu-
facturer (M l ) and two wholesalers (F1, W2). If MI sells to W1 at $0.50 and to W 2
at $1.00, then M1 is guilty of discriminating against secondary line competitors. See
RowE, supra note 3, at 180-95.
5. Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
6. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914); see also RowE, supra note
3, at 6.
7. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
8. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1939).
9. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat 730 (1914).
tions on the extent to which he could discriminate. Third, price dis-
criminations were prohibited only when made by one "engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce."'1 Yet it was not clear whether
the act prohibited a corporation which sold its products across state
lines from discriminating against a purchaser located in the state where
the corporation does business."
The framers of the Robinson-Patman Act sought to close these
loopholes. First, the act prohibited all price differentials other than
those justified by differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or de-
livery.' 2 Second, the "meeting competition" defense was made available
only to one who could show that his lower price "was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."' 3  Third, Congress
intended to liberalize the existing commerce requirements of the Clay-
ton Act by providing that the act would apply "where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce."' 4 This
clause was added to make clear that the sale to the victim need not cross
state lines if the sale to the favored buyer was in interstate commerce.15
This Note is concerned with the third modification of the Clay-
ton Act. Rather than broadening the scope of the act, as was the
intent of Congress, the courts have narrowly interpreted the commerce
provision. 6 The requirement that at least one of the commodities in-
volved in the discrimination be actually sold in interstate commerce has
been so construed as to preclude application of the act in numerous in-
stances. For instance, since it is generally held that retail sales of such
goods as gasoline and groceries are not sold "in" interstate commerce
but rather "come to rest" with the retail merchant, 17 price-cutting local
merchants have been able to escape the sanctions of the act, although
such merchants may have their prices set by an interstate corporation.' 8
10. Id.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). The statute provides in pertinent part: [Noth-
ing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing
methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered ...... However, the act also provides that "the Federal Trade Commission
may . . . fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary
• . . where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantity are so few as to render
differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly .... "
Thus, quantity discounts, even if cost-justified will be prohibited under the act if they
would ultimately have anticompetitive results. Id.
13. Clayton Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964).
14. Id. § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
15. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
16. See, e.g., Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
17. Id. at 209.
18. See, e.g., Flotken's West, Inc. v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp.
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Such an interpretation contrasts sharply with the court's construc-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 9 For an action under the Sherman
Act to lie, it is not necessary that the trade or the restraint of trade be
in interstate commerce; all that is required is that the transaction in
question adversely affect interstate commerce. 20  But the Sherman Act
did not always have such a broad interpretation. In the early part of
this century, the act could be applied only when the conspiracy of the
defendants directly restrained the flow of interstate trade.2  Only
through a long process of what could best be described as judicial
amendment did the Sherman Act reach its present jurisdictional limit.
In light of that expansion, the jurisdictional requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act should be similarly liberalized. A local discrimi-
natory sale should be deemed "in commerce" just as a local conspiracy
is now held to be "in restraint of interstate commerce." This exami-
nation rests upon the following premises: (1) There is no reason, ei-
ther textual or logical, why the commerce clause of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act cannot be construed as broadly as that of the Sherman Act;
(2) it was the intent of Congress that the commerce provision of the
Robinson-Patman Act be liberally construed; (3) because the scope of
its commerce requirement has been unduly restricted, the effectiveness
of the Robinson-Patman Act has been unnecessarily lessened. Before
considering these propositions, however, it will be useful to trace the de-
velopment of the commerce requirement under the Sherman Act. The
cases which liberalized that requirement can provide precedent by anal-
ogy for a similar liberalization of the Robinson-Patman Act's commerce
provision.
Expansion of the Sherman Act's Jurisdiction
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 2 2 the first Sherman Act case
to come before the Supreme Court, rendered that act almost com-
pletely useless. That case involved the acquisition by the American
Sugar Refining Company of four sugar refineries located in Philadel-
phia. These acquistions gave American Sugar "nearly complete con-
136, 140 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (retail sales in interstate grocery chain not covered by
Robinson-Patman).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964). Section 1 provides, inter alia: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal
... ." (emphasis added).
20. E.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
21. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), where the Court
found a violation of the Sherman Act even though the illegal acts occurred entirely
within one state.
22. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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trol of the manufacture of refined sugar within the United States.
'23
The government's attempt to cancel the acquisitions and to enjoin fur-
ther violations of the Sherman Act was unsuccessful. In finding for the
defendants, the Court took the extreme position that there was no "direct
relation" between commerce among the states and the manufacture of a
product within one state. 24  The unrealistic distinction between pro-
duction and commerce in the Knight case ultimately rested on the
Court's refusal to recognize that the commodity was produced with the
intent that it should go forth into the interstate market. The Court in
Knight equated "direct" restraints on commerce with restraints "in
commerce": Only "direct" restraints were subject to federal control, and
only a restraint "in commerce" could be "direct.
125
The history of the Sherman Act following the Knight case can be
conveniently divided into three general periods. During the first period
of over 40 years the courts gradually held constitutional greater exer-
cises of federal power over commerce but were careful to exclude local
activities not having a "direct" relationship to interstate commerce.
2 6
During President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Federal Gov-
ernment sought to regulate activities that could only be characterized
as local. During this second period, the Supreme Court came to hold
that a local activity whose only effect on interstate commerce was "in-
direct" could nevertheless be subject to federal control.27 In the third
period, which extends to the present, the federal courts have gradually
applied the New Deal courts' approach to factual situations in which the
effect of the regulated activity upon interstate commerce is marginal
at best.2 8 Each of these periods will be examined in detail.
A. Development Prior to the New Deal
The Court, which had virtually made the Sherman Act a dead let-
ter in Knight, breathed new life into the act 4 years later in Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States.2" Addyston was one of six de-
fendants who were enjoined from combining to fix prices and al-
locate territories among competitors. The Court found that the purpose
of the combination of iron pipe manufacturers was "to directly and by
means of such combination" restrain interstate commerce by means
of the illegal agreements.3" Knight was distinguished as a combination
in which the parties had not agreed about the future disposition of the
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 17.
25. See id.
26. See text accompanying notes 29-41 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 42-58 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 59-66 infra.
29. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
30. Id. at 240.
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manufactured product.31 The Court, in Addyston, restricted its hold-
ing by stating in dictum that the defendants would have been free "to
combine in regard to a proposal for pipe deliverable in their own state,"
although the pipe might be subsequently used in construction outside
the state.3
2
In Swift & Co. v. United States3s the Supreme Court was called
upon to decide the type of case which the dictum in Addyston had hy-
pothesized. The Court this time found that federal power could be
constitutionally employed to regulate such an intrastate activity. In
Swift meat dealers had entered into a conspiracy to fix prices, which
conspiracy a federal court enjoined under the Sherman Act. Although
these violations of the act were local, the Supreme Court held that the
injunction was properly issued. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court, declared:
[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cat-
tle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation
that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and
when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to
find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, con-
stantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of
commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part
and incident of such commerce.
34
This case is notable for at least two reasons. First, the "current
of commerce" concept was first used to justify regulation of a seemingly
intrastate activity. Second, the Court declined to base its holding on
the proposition that a purely intrastate activity could affect interstate
commerce. Instead the Court based its holding on the theory that
the Federal Government could prohibit an intrastate restraint on the
sale of a commodity if that commodity was involved in an interstate
transaction and was only temporarily within the state.
The "effect on commerce" doctrine, although not used in Swift,
was the ratio decidendi of the Shreveport Rate Case.5 This case, al-
though not arising under the Sherman Act, is nevertheless essential to
an understanding of the development of Congress's power to regulate
commerce. In this case the Supreme Court sustained an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission prohibiting several railroads from ad-
justing their rates to discriminate in favor of local traffic and against in-
terstate traffic. To the argument that Congress was without power tQ
confer upon the ICC authority to regulate intrastate rates, the Court
31. Id.
32. Id. at 247-48.
33. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
34. Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
35. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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answered that the commission did have that power when those local rates
adversely affected interstate commerce. In order to maintain fair and
orderly market conditions, the federal power over the intrastate activities
of an interstate concern was extended to all matters having a close and
substantial relationship to interstate commerce.3 6  The doctrine that a
purely local activity having a direct effect on interstate commerce was
subject to federal control was "inevitably to add force and scope to the
[Sherman Act].
'37
Although the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects
on interstate commerce could not be determined by reference to "mathe-
matical or rigid formulas, '3 8 it was possible to draw certain conclusions.
The federal courts were apparently willing to label "direct" any re-
straint on interstate commerce which had its origins in an intrastate ac-
tivity if that activity was conducted by a concern also engaged in in-
terstate commerce. 9 "Indirect" effects were those that a concern sell-
ing solely within one state might have on interstate commerce.4" It
was not until the early 1940s that the Supreme Court would declare the
distinction between "direct" and "indirect" to be meaningless.41
B. The New Deal
During the Great Depression, it was necessary for the Federal Gov-
ernment to provide vigorous leadership by the passage of bold, innova-
tive programs designed to promote relief, recovery and reform. The
federal courts, clinging as they did to an unrealistically narrow interpre-
tation of the Constitution's commerce clause, were at first an obstacle to
the exercise of federal power. The fate of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act42 is a good example of the conflict between the political and
judicial branches.
Perhaps the most significant measure passed during President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "First Hundred Days" was the National In-
36. Id. at 351.
37. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
231 (1948).
38. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466-67 (1938) (inter-
preting commerce clause in context of National Labor Relations Act).
39. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). But cf.
UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), wherein a local labor union not
engaged in interstate commerce was held not to have violated the Sherman Act. The
Court said that a "direct" restraint is effected when the "obstruction . . . is intended
to restrain commerce . . . , or has necessarily such a direct, material and substantial
effect to restrain it that the intent must reasonably be inferred." Id. at 411.
40. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 547
(1935).
41. Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
42. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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dustrial Recovery Act. It was the purpose of this act to stabilize wages
and prices by permitting industries to regulate themselves. 4 - Section
3 of the act authorized the President to promulgate "codes of fair com-
petition for the trade or industry. ' 4  The codes were to contain pro-
visions establishing minimum wages and free collective bargaining and
prohibiting unfair trade practices.4 5 Violation of any code provision
"in any transaction in or affecting interstate commerce" was made pun-
ishable as a misdemeanor. 46  Two years after the act was passed, how-
ever, the Supreme Court, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,47 struck down the NIRA as unconstitutional. After holding
that the act was invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power,48 the Court further held that the Constitution's commerce clause
did not permit a code to be applied to the petitioner, the operator of a
wholesale poultry slaughterhouse in Brooklyn whose sales were exclu-
sively local. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, said that the
transactions in question were not "in" commerce. 49 He distinguished
the "current of commerce" cases on the ground that the petitioner's
poultry was intended solely for local disposition. Nor did the transac-
tions "directly" affect commerce so as to bring them within the purview
of the commerce clause.50 The Court arrived at this conclusion de-
spite the fact that 96 percent of the poultry marketed in New York
came from other states. 51
Within 2 years after Schechter was decided, the Supreme Court
43. Id. § 1, 48 Stat, at 195.
44. Id. § 3(a), 48 Stat. at 196.
45. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946,
59 HAnv. L. Rv. 645, 653 (1946).
46. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3(f), 48 Stat. 197 (1933).
47. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
48. Id. at 542.
49. Id. at 543. "The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodi-
ties into a State does not mean that the flow continues after the property has arrived
and has become commingled with the mass of property within the State and is there
held solely for local disposition and use. So far as the poultry here in question is con-
cerned, the flow in interstate commerce had [permanently] ceased... . Hence, deci-
sions which deal with a stream of interstate commerce--where goods come to rest
within a State temporarily and are later to go forward in interstate commerce-and
with the regulations of transactions involved in that practical continuity of movement, are
not applicable here." Id.
50. Id. at 544-50. "[Where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate
commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power.
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which
could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority
would embrace practically all the activities of the people and the authority of the State
over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government."
Id. at 546.
51. Id. at 520.
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began to give a more realistic interpretation to the commerce clause.52
It was, however, Wickard v. Filburn,53 decided in 1942, which has had
the most significant effect on the Court's interpretation of the commerce
provision of the Sherman Act. Filburn owned a small farm in Ohio
on which he raised poultry and dairy cattle. He also harvested a small
acreage of wheat for home consumption and market sale. Pursuant to
the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938,14 the Department of Agri-
culture allocated Filburn 11 acres on which to plant his wheat. Fil-
burn planted and harvested 23 acres, refused to put the excess in stor-
age, and sued to enjoin enforcement of the penalty imposed upon him
by the act. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Jackson,
unanimously reversed the district court's injunction prohibiting enforce-
ment of the act. The Court regarded the case as particularly signifi-
cant because no previous decision had held that intrastate "activities may
be regulated where no part of the product is intended for interstate com-
merce or intermingled with the subjects thereof."" It was urged upon
the Court that the statute went beyond the reach of congressional power
since the effects were, at most, "indirect." The Court rejected this ar-
gument, declaring:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect." 56
The Court rejected the argument that Filburn's farm was too small
to have any significant effect on interstate commerce.
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of fed-
eral regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. 57
Mr. Justice Jackson used as authority for the above statement many
of the earlier antitrust cases which had held that when a local restraint
is part of a larger conspiracy, the local restraint is subject to federal
control.5 8 But Wickard went far beyond those previous cases to make
it clear that Congress could also regulate a local activity which was not
itself part of an interstate concern when the activity has a substantial
economic impact on interstate commerce.
52. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
53. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
54. Act of May 26, 1941, ch. 133, 55 Stat. 203, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1340
(1964).
55. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
56. Id. at 125.
57. Id. at 127-28.
58. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Northern Sec. Co.
v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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C. From the New Deal to the Present
Using the proposition that "Congress in passing the Sherman
Act wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power
." , and the Wickard decision as its judicial tools, the Court en-
gaged in a long and gradual expansion of the Sherman Act's jurisdiction.
The first major step in that expansion occurred when the case of United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.60 was decided. The respondents
were producers, wholesalers and retailers of alcoholic beverages. They
admitted on demurrer the allegation that they agreed to make con-
tracts fixing the retail prices of alcoholic beverages sold in Colorado and
to boycott all others who did not enter into the agreements. They were
adjudged guilty by the district court and fined. The court of appeals
reversed on the ground that the indictment failed to show any con-
spiracy in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals, affirming the judgment of the district court. The Court
noted that in resolving questions relating to the Sherman Act's jurisdic-
tion over a restraint of trade occurring within a single state that
there is an obviotis distinction to be drawn between a course of con-
duct wholly within a state and conduct which is an inseparable ele-
ment of a larger program dependent for its success upon activity
which affects commerce between the states. 61
Frankfort Distilleries is an example of a defendant engaged in in-
terstate commerce who restrained that commerce through its local ac-
tivities. In contrast, in United States v. Women's Sportswear Manu-
facturers Association0 2 the defendant trade association and its members
contended that they were engaged purely in intrastate commerce. The
association was charged with inducing jobbers in the woman's sports-
wear industry to employ only members of the association, all of whom
59. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944);
accord, United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932). But cf. Toolsen v. New York Yankees, Inc.,
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
60. 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
61. Id. at 297. See also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). In that case three California sugar refineries which
sold their production in interstate commerce entered into an agreement to pay uniform
prices for sugar beets purchased from the plaintiffs' farms, all of which were located in
Northern California. Rather than dealing with the very product (sugar) that moved
in interstate commerce, the local conspiracy concerned beets before they were turned
into sugar. The Court, nevertheless, held that the agreement to purchase beets was an
"inseparable element" of the later sale of sugar in interstate commerce. Id. at 237.
The Court concluded: "The vital thing is the effect on commerce, not the precise
point at which the restraint occurs or begins to take effect in a scheme as closely
knit as this in all phases of the industry." Id. at 238.
62. 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
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were unionized. The union members performed such functions as
stitching and attaching buttons for the jobbers. Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for a unanimous court, declared that it was not material that
the nature of the defendants' operations when considered alone may
be purely intrastate.6" Justice Jackson stated the commerce require-
ments of the Sherman Act to be as follows:
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the
line of movement of interstate commerce. The source of the re-
straint may be intrastate, as the making of a contract or combina-
tion usually is; the application of the restraint may be intrastate, as
it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or
restrain commerce among the states. If it is interstate commerce
that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze. 64
In Burke v. Ford65 the Supreme Court placed a new judicial gloss
on the Sherman Act's commerce provision. In that case a group of
Oklahoma liquor retailers sued under section 1 of the Sherman Act to
enjoin a state-wide market division by Oklahoma wholesalers. The dis-
trict court and the court of appeals found that interstate commerce
ceased at the point that the liquor "came to rest" in the wholesalers'
Oklahoma warehouses. Therefore, both courts held that the inter-
state commerce requirement of the Sherman Act had not been satisfied.
The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion. The Court
found that the absence of free competition reduced the number of sales
made by out of state distilleries to local retailers. This "substantial ef-
fect" on interstate commerce was enough to invoke the Sherman Act.66
From the above discussion the following conclusions may be
drawn. As the federal courts have given a broader interpretation to the
63. id. at 464.
64. Id. See also United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186
(1954), where a Chicago trade association of plastering contractors, a local union and
its president were charged with conspiring to bar the entry of new competitors in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Despite the allegation that all interstate
movement of plastering materials had ended before the local restraints became effec-
tive, the Court held that the commerce requirements had been satisfied. The Court
concluded: "That wholly local business restraints can produce the effects condemned
by the Sherman Act is no longer open to question." Id. at 189.
65. 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
66. Id. at 321. It may be cogently argued, however, that, in light of the factual
situation at bar, the Court's test was too broad. Language in the opinion seems to
indicate that there was a restraint of trade in interstate commerce: "Horizontal ter-
ritorial divisions almost invariably reduce competition among the participants....
The wholesalers' territorial division here almost surely resulted in fewer sales to re-
tailers-hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers-than would have occurred
had free competition prevailed among the wholesalers. In addition the wholesalers'
division of brands meant fewer wholesale outlets available to any one out-of-state
distiller." Id. at 321-22.
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Constitution's commerce clause, the commerce requirement under the
Sherman Act has been concomitantly liberalized. The reason for both
developments is the same: the judiciary recognized the compelling nec-
essity for federal intervention in the nation's economy. Given that ra-
tionale, it should follow that the applicability of the Robinson-Patman
Act should be similarly broadened. Indeed, it is clear from the legis-
lative history that the act was intended to be applied as broadly as was
constitutionally possible.
The Legislative History of the Robinson-Patman Act
The ineffectiveness of section 2 of the original Clayton Act has al-
ready been discussed.67  Those deficiencies became even more acute
with the advent of large chain stores and mail-order houses in the
1920s. These large scale buyers were able to demand discounts from
manufacturers and wholesalers without regard to the sellers' cost. Their
large orders also enabled them, by integrating the middleman functions,
to eliminate wholesale selling expenses. Retailers and wholesalers
formed political alliances to limit or offset the competitive advantages
of chain stores. On the state level one result of those alliances was "fair
trade" legislation."' On the national level, the Senate, in 1928, directed
the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the marketing and distrib-
uting functions of chain stores.69 The final results of that investigation
were presented to the Senate over 6 years later. °  It was the recom-
mendation of the FTC that all exceptions to unlawful price discrimina-
tions based on the quantity sold, the cost of selling or the need to meet
competition be eliminated. The Commission proposed an amendment
to the Clayton Act which would have prohibited all unfair and unjust
price discrimination and would have left to the FTC and the courts
the task of determining whether a violation had occurred. The text
of the amendment proposed by the FTC read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in any
transaction in or affecting such commerce, either directly or indi-
rectly to discriminate unfairly or unjustly in price between different
purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use,
consumption or resale within the United States or any Territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States.
71
Within a year this recommendation was incorporated verbatim in
67. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
68. E.g. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05 (originally enacted as CAL. STATS.
1931, ch. 278, at 583).
69. S. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CoNo. RkE. 7857 (1928).
70. FrC, CHAIN STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAN-STORE INvEmGATON,
S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
71. Id. at 96-97 (emphasis added).
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a bill introduced by Representative Mapes of Michigan. 2 By making
unlawful any price discrimination "in or affecting commerce," such leg-
islation would have significantly expanded the Clayton Act. Although
the seller would have been required to be engaged in interstate com-
merce, it would no longer have been necessary for the actual sale to take
place in interstate commerce. The United States Wholesale Grocers'
Association, however, feared that their interests would not be ade-
quately protected by the Mapes Bill, which was subsequently discarded
while in hearings.73 In its place the association drafted what was to be-
come the Patman Bill.
74
Representative Patman's Bill, as reported by the House Committee
on the Judiciary, contained the following provision which was not found
in the Robinson-Patman Act as finally enacted:
and that it shall also be unlawful for any person, whether in com-
inerce or not, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and qual-
ity where in any section or community and in any line of commerce
such discrimination may substantially lessen competition in com-
merce among either sellers or buyers or their competitors or may
restrain trade or tend to create a monopoly in commerce or any
line thereof.... .5
The subsequent deletion of this subsection has been advanced as evi-
dence that Congress intended that the commerce requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act be narrowly construed by the courts. 6  But the
Schechter case, decided only 2 weeks before Representative Patman in-
troduced his original bill, plainly made the language of the bill uncon-
stitutional.77 It was congressional doubt about the constitutionality of
the provision, not a desire that the Robinson-Patman Act's commerce
requirement be narrowly construed, that led to the elimination of the
provision.
7s
72. H.R. 4995, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
73. See Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of 1936, 23 VA. L. REV. 140, 143-44
(1936).
74. See Hearings on H.R. 8442 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936), where Representative Patman acknowledged that Mr. H.B.
Teegarden, counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association, actually wrote
his bill. See Evans, supra note 73, for a thorough discussion of the legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
75. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), as reported by the House Committee
on the Judiciary, March 31, 1936, quoted in ROWE, supra note 3, at 566.
76. See, e.g., C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 15 (2d rev. ed. 1959); ROWE, supra note 3, at 78.
77. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-50
(1935) (activities not "in" commerce must directly affect interstate commerce in order
to be subject to federal control).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
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Rather than restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the
act, Congress intended to expand that jurisdiction by adding a new
clause to the commerce provision of the original section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act. To the original commerce requirement of the act which re-
quired that the price discrimination be committed by one "engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce," was added the provision
that it shall be unlawful to discriminate "where either or any of the pur-
chases involved in such discrimination are in commerce." It is clear
from the legislative history that Congress intended this clause to extend
the protection of the Robinson-Patman Act.79 Although it was well
settled that is was unlawful for a seller in State A to discriminate against
customers or competitors in other states, there was doubt whether an
unlawful discrimination occurred when the victim and the discriminat-
ing seller were in State A and the favored buyer was in State B. The
addition of the phrase "where either or any" was intended to make
clear that the latter practice was illegal.
8 0
The federal courts have construed this clause to mean that at least
one of the sales must actually cross state lines.81 It is true that there is
testimony in the Congressional Record that would support this interpreta-
tion.82 However, this testimony "was based on the assumption that re-
tail sales are intrastate in nature and thus would not meet the commerce
requirements of the Act." 3 Indeed, that the Schechter decision clearly
affected the drafting of the act's commerce provision is shown by the
following comment of the House Report:
[The phrase "where either or any"] is of first importance in ex-
tending the protections of this bill against the full evil of price dis-
crimination, whether immediately in interstate or intrastate com-
merce whenever it is of such a character as tends directly to bur-
den or affect interstate commerce.6 4
It is submitted, therefore, that the courts' construction of the com-
merce provision of the Robinson-Patman Act is not supported by con-
gressional intent. What is clear from the evidence is that Congress in-
tended to exercise all of its powers over commerce when it passed the
Robinson-Patman Act.8 5 Just as the power of Congress to regulate in-
79. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
80. Id.
81. See text accompanying notes 95-129 infra.
82. 80 Cong. Rec. 8103 (1936) (remarks of Representative Mapes that the
Robinson-Patman Act would not apply to the sales of retail merchants).
83. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 210 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969).
84. H.R. RP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
85. H.R. RP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936). Accord, Alabama Inde-
pendent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386, 389 (N.D. Ala.
1939). Contra, Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 676 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ("in
enacting the ... Robinson-Patman Act ... Congress did not exercise all of its
powers over commerce . . ").
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terstate commerce has expanded, so should the federal courts's con-
struction of the act's commerce requirement become broader. The
"guiding ideal" of Congress when it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act
was the "preservation of equality of opportunity so far as possible to all
who are usefully employed in the service of distribution and produc-
tion."86  The judiciary's application of the act, however, has often-
and unnecessarily-undermined that ideal.
Judicial Interpretation of the Robinson-Patman
Act's Commerce Requirement
In the 1954 decision of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. 7 the Su-
preme Court clearly recognized that interstate corporations, if they could
not be regulated under the Robinson-Patman Act, could destroy all lo-
cal competition. Moore, the plaintiff, had a bakery business in Santa
Rosa, New Mexico, which competed with the defendant Mead's in the
sale of bread to local Santa Rosa merchants. Mead's, one of several
corporations with interlocking ownership, had a plant in Clovis, New
Mexico, which served not only Santa Rosa but also Farwell, Texas.
Moore's sales, on the other hand, were purely intrastate. A "price war"
developed in Santa Rosa between the two competitors, although Mead's
maintained its higher prices in Farwell. Moore, eventually forced out
of business, brought an action for treble damages, alleging violations
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Douglas, affirmed the district court's judgment for the plain-
tiff. Although discriminatory prices had been charged only in intra-
state sales, the Court nevertheless held that the commerce requirement
of the Robinson-Patman Act had been satisfied.88  The commerce pro-
vision of the act-"where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce"-clearly applied to the case at bar.
The Supreme Court had already made it clear that "no single sale can
violate the Robinson-Patman Act. At least two transactions must take
place in order to constitute a discrimination."8 9 The Court in Moore
properly compared the sales made by Mead's in Santa Rosa with its
sales in Texas, thus finding a discriminatory sale "in commerce."
The Court recognized that its decision was clearly consistent with
the legislative history of the Robison-Patman Act.9" Moreover, Jus-
tice Douglas supported his opinion with the following dictum:
86. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
87. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
88. Id. at 119.
89. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947).
90. 348 U.S. at 120. The Court quoted Representative Utterback, manager of the
Conference Bill: "Where ...a manufacturer sells to customers both within the State
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May 19711 ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 1259
If this method of competition were approved, the pattern for growth
of monopoly would be simple. As long as the price warfare was
strictly intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with
impunity at the expense of local merchants. The competitive ad-
vantage would then be with the interstate combines, not by reason
of their skills or efficiency but because of their strength and ability
to wage price wars. The profits made in interstate activities
would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns. No
instrumentality of interstate commerce would be used to destroy the
local merchant and expand the domain of the combine. But the
opportunities afforded by interstate commerce would be employed
to injure local trade. Congress, as guardian of the Commerce
Clause, certainly has power to say that those advantages shall not
attach to the privilege of doing an interstate business.91
Although the above is "mere" dictum, the Court clearly indicated
that if an interstate corporation financially supports local price discrimi-
nations through its interstate sources, then it should be subject to the
Robinson-Patman Act. The lower federal courts in subsequent Robin-
son-Patman Act cases have interpreted the act more narrowly. Moore
has been narrowly distinguished as a case in which one of the sales in-
volved in the discrimination crossed a state line.92 As a result, there
are two economically important situations in which a sale will not be
"in commerce" although the seller is wholly owned or financially sup-
ported by an interstate enterprise. First, it has been held that if a cor-
poration engaged in interstate commerce has a local plant which pro-
duces, processes and sells a commodity solely within one state, the
courts may not compare those sales to the sales of the same commodity
by the corporation's other plants which do cross state lines.93 Second,
the courts have continued to apply obsolete theories of interstate com-
merce so as to bar all remedy to local merchants injured by discrimina-
tory local sales made by interstate corporations. 94 These two limita-
tions will be examined in detail in the following sections.
A. The Autonomy of Local Processing Plants-
A Curious Interpretation
Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Products Corp.9 5 marked
and beyond the State, he may not favor either to the disadvantage of the other; he
may not use the privilege of interstate commerce to the injury of his local trade ......
91. Id. at 119-20.
92. E.g., Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 209 (5th Cir.
1969); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967);
Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963); Flotken's West, Inc. v. National Food Stores,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136, 138 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
93. See text accompanying notes 95-103 infra.
94. See text accompanying notes 104-29 infra.
95. 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963).
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the origin of a serious limitation of the applicability of the Robinson-
Patman Act. In Willard the plaintiff, a local dairy which sold all of its
products within a small area of Ohio, charged that the defendant, a na-
tional company with dairy processing plants in many states, had vio-
lated the act by making discriminatory sales from its Shelby, Ohio,
plant. The defendant admitted reducing the prices of its milk in the
area where it competed with the plaintiff while maintaining a higher
price in other areas of Ohio, also served by the Shelby plant. The corn-
plant alleged discrimination by the defendant's Shelby plant, but did
not claim any of that plant's products were shipped in interstate com-
merce. The plaintiff attempted to amend its complaint by alleging that
the defendant's other Ohio plants, which were engaged in interstate com-
merce, had maintained their prices. The trial judge refused to allow this
amendment and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
defendant's interstate shipments "from other than its Shelby, Ohio,
plant to areas in which the plaintiff did not engage in business" were
wholly "immaterial" to the case.
96
It is clear that Willard narrowed the applicability of the Robinson-
Patman Act. In determining whether there has been a price discrimi-
nation, a court may compare the allegedly discriminatory sale only with
those sales made by the same plant or distributor. If that plant makes
only local sales, then the commerce requirement of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act has not been satisfied, although the plant may be owned and
controlled by a corporation whose other plants make sales in interstate
commerce.
9 7
The Willard decision was closely followed by another very simi-
lar case, Borden Co. v. FTC.18  It was alleged that Borden violated the
act by failing to charge its customers uniform prices for milk produced
in Ohio and processed at Borden's Portsmouth, Ohio, plant. The
F.T.C. trial examiner followed the Willard rule and found no violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act. His decision was reversed by the Federal
Trade Commission which "placed great stress on the fact that Borden
96. 309 F.2d at 946. Mr. Justice Black dissented from the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari. In language reminiscent of the Moore decision Mr. Justice Black declared:
"Refusing to grant certiorari here means that this Court is allowing the economic re-
sources and staying power of an interstate company to be used with impunity to
destroy local competition, precisely the sort of thing the Robinson-Patman Act aimed to
prevent." 373 U.S. 934, 935-36 (1963).
97. 309 F.2d at 946.
98. 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964) (The FTC also found that Borden had en-
gaged in price discriminations adversely affecting primary-line competition in Indiana.
The Seventh Circuit vacated that part of the commission's order on the basis that com-
petitive injury had not been sufficiently established.)
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is engaged in interstate commerce." 9 It was the view of the commis-
sion that Borden's "operations constitute an 'interstate complex' and that
its practices and policies have an 'interstate homogenity.' "100 The opin-
ion concluded: "Since it is impossible to divorce The Borden Com-
pany and its products, if The Borden Company is in commerce, so must
be all of its products."' 1  The Seventh Circuit disagreed, preferring to
rely on the dissent to the commission's decision:
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, states the jurisdic-
tional requirement respecting 'commerce' in three separate ways,
and each of these variants of the commerce requirement must be
satisfied. First, respondent must be 'engaged in commerce'; sec-
ond, the unlawful discrimination must occur 'in the course of such
commerce'; third, 'either or any of the purchases involved in such
discriminations must be 'in commerce.'
"[U]nless the third commerce requirement of Section 2(a) is
to be given no effect whatever, the Commission's burden of estab-
lishing jurisdiction cannot be discharged merely by a showing that
respondent is an interstate concern or that it makes interstate sales
not involved in the challenged discrimination.10 2
Although the obvious meaning of the "third commerce require-
ment" is that at least one of these sales involved in the discrimination must
cross state lines, it is by no means obvious that the sales of only one plant
may be compared to find "the purchases involved in such discrimina-
tions." And, even more important, it must be remembered that the
"third requirement" was added to the Robinson-Patman Act to extend
its reach, not to restrict it.' 3
Moreover, it should be clear that the "two-plant" rule makes it
possible for a large, interstate corporation to violate the Robinson-Pat-
man Act with impunity. If such a corporation has two or more centers
of manufacture within a state, raw materials from other states may be
shipped to those plants, where they are used to manufacture the final
product. One plant, solely for the purpose of destroying its competitors,
may take intrastate sales at price A, while the other plant sells some or
all of its products across the state line at price B-possibly to the compet-
itors of those buying at price A. Despite the clear effect on inter-
state commerce of both sales, the corporation, under the present case
law, has not violated the act. The corporation's very size has given it
immunity from the sanctions of the Robinson-Patman Act--certainly a
result contrary to the intent of its framers.
99. Id. at 955.
100. Id., quoting from Commissioner Dixon's majority opinion for the FTC.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
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B. Retail Sales and the "Come to Rest" Doctrine-
An Outmoded Concept
The first Supreme Court decision to hold that the "flow of com-
merce" doctrine was applicable in Robinson-Patman Act cases was
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.04  The issue in that case was whether
temporary storage of gasoline within a state, by a company in inter-
state commerce, would deprive the gasoline of its interstate character.
The proposition that sales from local storage plants to retailers and
jobbers within the same state "are but a throat through which the
current flows,"' 5 and hence part of interstate commerce, had received
early acceptance.' 0 6 A conflict of opinion soon developed,0 " how-
ever, and it was not until the Standard Oil decision that the issue was
effectively resolved: Temporary storage of a commodity by a company
engaged in interstate commerce does not alter the interstate nature of
sales to local retailers.
Any other conclusion would fall short of the recognized purpose of
the Robinson-Patman Act to reach the operations of large inter-
state businesses in competition with small local concerns.' 0 8
On the other hand, once the commodity has reached the retailer
the courts have held that the flow of commerce has terminated, and any
subsequent sale by the retailer to the public at large is no longer part of
interstate commerce.'0 9 The commodity is said to "come to rest" at
the retailer's place of business while it awaits resale to the public at
104. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
105. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922).
106. E.g., Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436, 437 (N.D.
II1. 1941); Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939); see Nachman v. Shell Oil Co., 1944-45 Trade Cas.
57,361 (D. Md. 1945).
107. Compare Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1943) with
cases cited note 106 supra.
108. 340 U.S. at 237-38. Nor does it matter if the product has undergone minor
processing while it is temporarily at rest. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d
674 (5th Cir. 1956).
109. Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969);
Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1042 (1970); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967);
Flotken's West, Inc. v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
The court in Cliff gave three exceptions to the general rule: "Retail sales of goods
shipped into a state may be considered to remain within the flow of commerce under
three circumstances: (1) Where they are purchased by the retailer upon the order of a
customer with the definite intention that the goods are to go at once to the customer;
(2) where the goods are purchased by the retailer from the supplier to meet the needs
of specified customers pursuant to some understanding with the customer, although
not for immediate delivery; and (3) where the goods are purchased by the retailer
based on the anticipated needs of specific customers." 417 F.2d at 210.
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large."10 The case of Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co.",, has been
said to demonstrate "the distinction, insofar as Robinson-Patman is con-
cerned, between the flow of gasoline from a producer to retail dealers,
as in Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission .. .and subse-
quent purchases by random customers from the dealers at their place of
business.""' 2 Walker Oil Co. charged that Hudson Oil Co. lowered its
prices at a Florida gasoline station to injure Walker while it maintained
higher prices at another station located 60 miles away in Alabama. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming defendant's motion
for summary judgment, held that the retail sales to random members of
the general public were not "in commerce" and hence the price differ-
entials between the two gasoline stations did not violate the Robinson-
Patman Act."
3
The distinction between the applicability of the Sherman Act and
the Robinson-Patman Act is distinctly shown by the case of Food
Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's Inc."4 -Food Basket operated a single in-
dependent supermarket located in Taylorsville, Utah. Albertson's was
an interstate supermarket chain with stores throughout the state, includ-
ing one in Taylorsville. It purchased its groceries and frozen foods from
two Salt Lake City Wholesalers. Food Basket alleged that it was driven
out of business by the predatory tactics of Albertson's, which violated
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Food Basket sought to
prove that Albertson's sold products at its Taylorsville store at lower
prices than it sold like merchandise at its other stores, both within and
outside the State. The district court granted Albertson's motion for
summary judgment on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, which judg-
ment was sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.115
Food Basket made two arguments in support of the applicability
of the Robinson-Patman Act. First relying upon dictum in Moore," 6
it argued the act should apply since Albertson's subsidized its losses
with profits from "its interstate treasury.""11 7  The court rejected the ar-
gument, distinguishing Moore as a case where the defendant made sales
across state lines. The present case only involved "two purely local
discriminatory sales in different states,""18 and hence outside the scope
110. Cases cited note 109 supra.
111. 414 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
112. Flotken's West, Inc. v. National Food Stores, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 136, 139
(E.D. Mo. 1970).
113. 414 F.2d at 588-89.
114. 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
115. Id.
116. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954). See text
accompanying note 91 supra.
117. 383 F.2d at 787.
118. Id. at 788.
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of the act. The court, nevertheless, recognized the logic of the plain-
tiff's argument and was forced to admit that Moore was "susceptible"
to the construction urged by Food Basket.'19 The court, however, re-
jected the argument by concluding: "It seems safe to assume that if the
post-Meade [sic] Bread case law is contrary to the language used there,
the Supreme Court would have corrected the misinterpretation on re-
peated applications for certiorari."
120
Alternatively, Food Basket contended that a "practical continuity"
theory should apply; that is, since substantially all the goods sold in
Utah were proceessed and packaged outside the state, "the discrimina-
tory sales were in the flow of commerce and within the interdiction
of 2(a).' 12' The Court responded, by noting:
It is, of course, true if goods originating out of the state can be said
to be shipped to the wholesalers in anticipation of orders from re-
tailers, or if a substantial part of the goods were shipped directly
out of the state to the retailers as drop shipments, the discriminatory
sales are within the scope of 2(a). .... 122
The court concluded that the case at bar did not involve such a fac-
tual situation. Even if the goods were shipped to wholesalers in antici-
pation of orders from retailers, however, the weight of authority clearly
dictated judgment for the defendant. 123 In the court's hypothetical, the
sales of local wholesalers would be subject to the Robinson-Patman Act,
but it would not remove the immunity of retailers in their sales to the
public at large.
1 24
The restrictive doctrine that retail goods reaching the shelves of a
retail grocer are no longer in commerce was dispositive of Cliff Food
Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.121 Cliff Foods was a small grocery chain
operating three stores in the Dallas, Texas area. Kroger was the third
largest retail grocery chain in the nation and had forty stores in the Dal-
las area, including four operating under the name of Bi-Lo. Bi-Lo sold
the same products at lower prices than Cliff's stores, which suffered a
resulting sharp drop in sales. Kroger, however, maintained its out-of-
state prices. Holding that the Robinson-Patman Act "was not intended
to regulate retail sales to consumers," 2 the district court dismissed
119. Id. at 787.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 788.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Walker Oil Co. v. Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969);
Savon Gas Station No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963); cf. C.S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Food &
Grocery Bureau, 33 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
124. See Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
125. 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969).
126. Id. at 208.
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Cliff's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed,12 7 although it refused to hold that all retail sales are beyond the
purview of the Robinson-Patman Act. The court noted, in dictum,
that not only may the goods remain within the flow of commerce if
they are ordered by the retailer for the anticipated needs of specified
customers, 28 but they may also reenter the flow of commerce if the re-
tailer makes deliveries across state lines.
129
The "come to rest" doctrine had its origin in the Schechter deci-
sion.13 0 Since the retailer usually does not hold the commodity for
purposes of any further interstate transaction, the commodity comes to
rest within the state. Schechter distinguished "stream of commerce"
cases, such as Swift, as situations where the goods, after being shipped
into a state, later go forward in interstate commerce. 131 Yet Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC32 distinctly held that a commodity could remain in in-
terstate commerce after it crossed state lines for the last time. Further-
more, Standard Oil cannot be distinguished as a case where the com-
modity was stored in anticipation of orders from specified retailers.
Likewise, distinctions between retail sales based on anticipated needs of
specified customers and sales to the random public become completely
arbitrary when the retail sale is controlled and financed by an inter-
state corporation. In both situations the retail sale, for purposes of the
Robinson-Patman Act, should be recognized as being in commerce.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the retail sales of an interstate corporation to
the public at large should be considered as "being in commerce." This
Note, however, suggests that justice could best be served by mak-
ing applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act's commerce requirement
equal to that of the Sherman Act. Thus, any local price discrimina-
tion that adversely affected interstate commerce would be prohibited by
the Robinson-Patman Act. Given the Supreme Court's current ten-
127. On appeal the plaintiff also argued that Kroger, in its capacity as an inte-
granted wholesaler-retailer, violated the Robinson-Patman Act by selling products to
stores in competition with the plaintiff at a lower price than to its other stores.
The court of appeals held that the charges were not properly before the court since
they had not been raised at the trial. Id. at 208 n.3. Even if they had been properly
raised, however, it is difficult to see how the plaintiff could have prevailed in his claim
of injury to secondary line competition. The plaintiff was not a "purchaser" within
the meaning of the act, and therefore had no standing to sue. Becker v. Safelite
Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965).
128. 417 F.2d at 210.
129. Id. at 210 n.4.
130. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
131. Id. at 543.
132. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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dency to find that even remote local restraints substantially affect inter-
state commerce,"' the deficiencies of the Robinson-Patman Act's com-
merce requirement would be totally eliminated.
The Sherman Act was not always covered with the judicial gloss
that has so effectively increased its scope. The act began its long his-
tory in the courts with one of the most restrictive interpretations imagin-
able.'1 4  The federal judiciary, however, have come to acknowledge
that Congress wanted to exercise all of the power available to it when it
enacted the Sherman Act. 13' Recognizing that "the federal commerce
power is as broad as the economic needs of the nation,"13 the courts
have greatly increased the scope of the Sherman Act.
Congress also enacted the Robinson-Patman Act in the belief that
its commerce provision was as broad as was constitutionally possible.1 37
Nor should the difference in wording between the two statutes be con-
trolling, especially in light of congressional intent. Neither the legisla-
tive history of the Robinson-Patman Act nor its wording compels the
restrictive interpretation the courts have given it."' Just as the Sher-
man Act underwent a process of judicial amendment, so also should the
Robinson-Patman Act be more liberally-and realistically-construed
to remedy its inadequacies.
Its deficiencies are obvious, and have been discussed at length.
First, the "two-plant" doctrine makes it possible for a corporation do-
ing business in interstate commerce to make discriminatory interstate
sales with impunity. 1 9 There is absolutely nothing in the wording or
legislative history of the act to compel this result. Second, and more
important, the Robinson-Patman Act is inapplicable to most cases in-
volving discriminatory retail sales.'14  Ironically, chain stores, those
menaces that necessitated the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act,
have been able to employ their predatory practices at the retail level-
133. See Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
134. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
135. Cases cited note 59 supra.
136. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
137. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
138. It may be argued, of course, that a construction of the clause "where either
or any of the purchases involved ... are in commerce" to mean "where either or
any of the purchases involved . . . affect commerce" would render that clause meaning-
less. That is, because virtually every transaction has some effect on interstate com-
merce, both purchases would almost always be "in commerce" under the proposed inter-
pretation. The answer to this argument is that, in 1936, "in commerce" and "affect
commerce" were practically synonymous. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
Since the meaning of the latter term has been broadened, it makes no sense to argue that
the former term should remain static.
139. See text accompanying notes 95-103 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 104-29 supra.
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because of the judicial interpretation of the legislation that was designed
to regulate them.
It should be obvious that the inadequacies of the act stem from the
failure of the courts to distinguish between entities which are wholly in-
trastate and those which do business within and without a state. Vast
interstate enterprises have been able to remove themselves from the re-
strictions inposed by the Robinson-Patman Act by successfully claim-
ing that their sales were not made "in commerce." In short, the act
has been bound to conceptions of commerce which were repudiated 30
years ago. The primary victims are the businessmen it was designed
to protect.
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